Chemical Castration for Rapists

Chemical castration is the use of hormonal medication used to suppress the sexual drive. It is used mainly by countries as a preventive measure or punishment on people who violate their laws on sexual behavior. The term “chemical castration” is a misnomer: It should be more appropriately called “hormonal androgen depletion” or “anti-hormone treatment.” Its effects are completely reversible. Medroxyprogesterone acetate (MPA), the drug mandated by the Florida Legislature for use in chemical castrations, is more commonly known as Depo-Provera. In men, the drug reduces the production of the hormone testosterone in the testes and the adrenal glands, and, therefore, reduces the level of testosterone circulating through the bloodstream. As testosterone levels drop, so does the putative sex drive in most men. The physiological effects of Depo-Provera thus include temporary diminution of erections and ejaculations and a reduction in sperm count.

Sentencing Multipliers Under the Criminal Punishment Code: Use of Juvenile Priors for the Grand Theft Motor Vehicle Multiplier

There is a lot of misunderstanding about sentencing multipliers under Florida's Criminal Punishment Code, particularly when it comes to the Grand Theft Motor Vehicle multiplier and the use of juvenile priors as predicate offenses.

The Grand Theft Motor Vehicle multiplier is applicable where the primary offense charged is grand theft of a motor vehicle and the defendant's prior record includes three more grand thefts of a motor vehicle. The confusion is usually over whether juvenile priors can be used as predicate offenses, and if so, whether or not there has to have been an adjudication of delinquency. Typical is the following question I received a few days ago from an Assistant State Attorney in the 15th Circuit, reproduced verbatim:

No Death Penalty for Child Rapists

The United States Supreme Court today in a 5-4 opinion in the case of Kennedy v. Louisiana,(1) authored by Justice Kennedy and joined in by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer, ruled that the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause prohibits states from imposing the death penalty for the rape of a child where the crime did not result, and was not intended to result, in the child's death. The Court also ruled that the application of this law to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment renders the Louisiana statute under which petitioner Patrick Kennedy was sentenced to death for the brutal rape of his eight-year-old stepdaughter unconstitutional. As for the death penalty in Florida, however, it will be business as usual.

The facts of Kennedy were compelling: Patrick Kennedy brutally raped his eight-year-old stepdaughter on March 2, 1998 and coached her to lie about it to the police. That morning, the victim was transported by ambulance to Children’s Hospital where she was examined in the emergency room. The victim’s predominate injury was vaginal with profuse bleeding. Her entire perineum was torn and her rectum protruded into her vagina. A pediatric surgeon was called in to repair the damage, which was repaired successfully. However, as a result of pain, the victim had to be fed gallons of stool softener through a tube to permit her to begin defecating again. At trial, the defendant was convicted of aggravated rape and a unanimous jury recommended that Kennedy receive the death penalty, which the sentencing court imposed. He appealed his conviction and sentence and the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed both, reasoning that the death penalty was proportionate in the circumstances because

The Apprendi and Blakely Cases

On June 26, 2000, the United States Supreme Court in its review of the case of Charles C. Apprendi against the State of New Jersey ruled that, consistent with the Sixth Amendment, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, other than the fact of a prior conviction, must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.(1) In a subsequent review of the case of Ralph Howard Blakely against the State of Washington, the Court clarified Apprendi further by ruling that the “statutory maximum” for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant, that a defendant can waive his Apprendi rights, and that when a defendant pleads guilty, the State is free to seek judicial sentence enhancements so long as the defendant either stipulates to the relevant facts or consents to judicial fact finding.(2) In other words, the relevant “statutory maximum” is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he or she may impose without any additional findings.


When a judge inflicts punishment that the jury’s verdict alone does not allow, the jury has not found all the facts which the law makes essential to the punishment, and the judge exceeds his or her proper authority.(3) The application of the principles of Apprendi to guidelines sentencing schemes was reaffirmed by the Court in United States v. Booker,(4) which held that the imposition of a sentence under the federal sentencing guidelines based on additional facts that the sentencing judge found by a preponderance of the evidence violated the Sixth Amendment.

Sample Questions for Judicial Candidates

What would you ask a judicial candidate if you had the opportunity to question him or her?

The quality of our judiciary has a direct correlation to the quality of what goes on in our courts of law, including our sentencings in criminal court. Although slightly off-topic for a sentencing blog, the following is a complilation of sample questions to ask those who would be our judges:

I. Knowledge.

1. Do you believe the composition of juries adequately and fairly reflects society at large? Why or why not? If not, what can we do to change this? What are the pros and cons of using drivers license registration as a source of jurors?

Vindictive Sentencing

The issue of vindictive sentencing can arise at original sentencing or at resentencing. A vindictive sentence is imposed where the defendant is punished for exercising his or her appellate rights or where any judicially imposed penalty needlessly discourages assertion of the Fifth Amendment right not to plead guilty and deters the exercise of the Sixth Amendment right to demand a jury trial, and such a sentence is patently unconstitutional.(1) Vindictiveness in sentencing does not mean that the trial judge affirmatively intends to punish the defendant for rejecting a plea. “Vindictive” in this context is a term of art which expresses the legal effect of a given course of action, and does not imply any personal or subjective animosity between the court and the defendant.(2)

Increased Punishment Upon Resentencing

The constitutions of Florida and the United States impose no limitations whatever upon the power to retry a defendant who has succeeded in getting his or her first conviction set aside.(1) A corollary of the power to retry a defendant is the power, upon the defendant’s reconviction, to impose whatever sentence may be legally authorized, whether or not it is greater than the sentence imposed after the first conviction.(2) That a defendant’s conviction is overturned on collateral rather than direct attack is irrelevant for these purposes.(3) A defendant who has previously been sentenced may thus be resentenced upon remand from an appellate court, upon the trial court’s granting of a motion to correct a sentencing error pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800, or upon vacatur of the sentence for fraud or misrepresentation, without running afoul of due process, equal protection, or double jeopardy considerations. These constitutional guarantees also impose no restrictions upon the length of a sentence imposed upon resentencing.