Early Termination of Probation or Community Control

This article summarizes the law of sentencing pertaining to early termination of probation  or community control in Florida state courts.

Hon. William H. Burgess, III, B.C.S.

July 10, 2024

Early termination of supervision is a tool used to encourage good behavior and faithful compliance with the terms of probation or community control.  There is, however, no statutory or constitutional prohibition precluding a trial court from requiring a defendant to complete a full term of probation or community control.

Motion for Early Termination

When presented with a motion for early termination of probation or community control, the court is required to afford the movant procedural due process.  At a minimum, the court must consider the motion and exercise its discretion in granting or denying the motion.  In a case where the parties have entered into a plea agreement that sets forth a specific length of supervision, the court cannot avoid the issue by concluding that it lacks authority to consider the motion.¹

Revocation of Probation or Community Control—Failure to Pay Court-Ordered Costs or Restitution

 Hon. William H. Burgess, III, B.C.S.

Generally

Trial courts have the power to provide, as a condition of probation or community control, that the defendant pay reasonable sums for court costs¹ and other costs to the state (e.g., attorney’s fees for the services of a public defender),² costs of supervision,³ and restitution⁴ under the broad grant of authority contained in section 948.03, Fla. Stat.  The decision to place a defendant on supervision reflects a determination by the sentencing court that the State’s penological interests do not require imprisonment.⁵  In any event, a probationer’s or community controllee’s failure to make reasonable efforts to repay his or her debt to society may indicate that the original determination needs reevaluation, and imprisonment may now be required to satisfy the State’s interests,⁶ and so supervision can be revoked for failure to comply with such a condition.

This power is qualified by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which requires that the statutory ceiling placed on imprisonment for any substantive offense be the same for all defendants irrespective of their economic status.  The State therefor cannot imprison a defendant for nonvoluntary failure to pay a fine, court costs, or restitution without violating the equal protection clause.⁷  Likewise, the Constitution prohibits the State from imposing a fine as a sentence and then automatically converting it into a jail term solely because the defendant is indigent and cannot forthwith pay the fine in full.⁸  Sentencing a defendant to imprisonment solely because he or she could not pay a fine, court costs, or restitution, without considering the reasons for the inability to pay or the propriety of reducing the amount to be paid, extending the time for payments, or making alternative orders, is automatically converting monetary such obligations into imprisonment and is constitutionally impermissible.⁹  The requirement that a defendant may be found in willful violation of a supervisory condition to make money payments only if he or she is or could reasonably be financially in a position to do so is one of constitutional dimensions and cannot be waived by the defendant.¹⁰

Judicial Discretion In the Imposition of Sentence—Conditions of Confinement

Hon. William H. Burgess, III, B.C.S.

A sentencing court lacks jurisdiction and authority to regulate the treatment and placement of sentenced prison inmates absent specific statutory authority, and cannot impose increased sanctions pertaining to confinement, such as loss of privileges.  This rule applies to county jails as well as to facilities run by the Department of Corrections.¹

Once a trial court has pronounced sentence and entered a judgment of conviction, it relinquishes jurisdiction over the matter to the executive branch, except for the appellate process and to the extent that regular procedures allow the matter to be reopened in a judicial forum for limited purposes that can be achieved only in court.  Just as the executive branch of government may not intrude on the judiciary’s duties in the sentencing process, so is the judicial branch limited in its role thereafter as the sentence is executed.²

Confrontation, Due process, and the Use of Hearsay: The Florida Evidence Code Was Not Meant to Apply to Sentencing

Hon. William H. Burgess, III, B.C.S.

Accuracy and integrity of fact-finding in criminal sentencing is determined by the burden of proof, the reliability of the underlying evidence, and the opportunity for review and response. The balance of these factors promotes fairness in the individual case and in the overall pattern of sentences over time. Such accuracy is not an absolute in every type of case, however, but is measured against the requirements of the law applicable in the circumstances. Generally, the more severe the potential sanction, the higher the degree of accuracy and reliability of the evidence required to impose the sanction.

Sharp Practices in the Legal Profession

Hon. William H. Burgess, III, B.C.S. 

"Pettifogger" 3-D sculpture by Daniel Midholt, based on a design by Stefan Andersson.  Image found at https://www.artstation.com/artwork/zND4d. No claim to copyright.

One of the more vexing aspects of the legal profession is having to deal with attorneys who engage in sharp practice.

“Sharp practice” is a pejorative expression for unscrupulous conduct, undertaken for the purpose of obtaining an unfair advantage over another, that may (or may not) be technically within the applicable law or rules and is considered immoral, unethical or improper. In business dealings, sharp practice often involves activities that come very close to breaking the law.¹ In the legal profession, the greater part of sharp practice occurs on a continuum just beyond the proper bounds of zealous advocacy,² honor,³ and ethics but just short of outright fraud. It is the sort of behavior that no self-respecting lawyer or judge should have to suffer and no properly functioning legal system should tolerate.

Sentence Mitigation: Acceptance of Responsibility

Hon. William H. Burgess, III, B.C.S.

A common and longstanding practice in the trial courts of Florida is to reward defendants who accept responsibility for their actions with lighter sentences than those defendants might otherwise have received. Many prosecutors encourage this form of sentence mitigation and it is not unusual for prosecutors to agree to downward departure sentences for such defendants in appropriate circumstances, usually early in the case. Appellate courts have noted that acceptance of responsibility is an appropriate factor for the court to consider in mitigating a sentence.¹ As a practical matter, early acceptance of responsibility can show actual or potential rehabilitation,² and it furthers the important state interests in judicial efficiency and economy. There is, however, no consensus within the trial and appellate courts as to what “acceptance of responsibility” or “early acceptance of responsibility” is, and so it is an open question as to whether or not this is a valid stand-alone basis for departure below a presumptive minimum sentence.

Sentence Mitigation: Extraordinary Restitution

Hon. William H. Burgess, III, B.C.S.

Ordinarily, the payment or promised payment of restitution is not a basis for downward departure outside of the provisions of sections 921.0026(2)(e) and 921.185, Florida Statutes. A further basis for downward departure may be extraordinary restitution, whether paid before or after a defendant enters a plea, where the defendant demonstrates acceptance of responsibility and makes exceptional efforts to fully remedy the harm caused by the offense. The sentencing laws of Florida do not prohibit downward sentencing departures in such situations and no Florida appellate court has taken up the issue. Nonetheless, such a departure is arguably permitted in appropriate circumstances by the provisions of subsections 921.002(1)(c)¹ and (3).²