Early Termination of Probation or Community Control

This article summarizes the law of sentencing pertaining to early termination of probation  or community control in Florida state courts.

Hon. William H. Burgess, III, B.C.S.

July 10, 2024

Early termination of supervision is a tool used to encourage good behavior and faithful compliance with the terms of probation or community control.  There is, however, no statutory or constitutional prohibition precluding a trial court from requiring a defendant to complete a full term of probation or community control.

Motion for Early Termination

When presented with a motion for early termination of probation or community control, the court is required to afford the movant procedural due process.  At a minimum, the court must consider the motion and exercise its discretion in granting or denying the motion.  In a case where the parties have entered into a plea agreement that sets forth a specific length of supervision, the court cannot avoid the issue by concluding that it lacks authority to consider the motion.¹

Revocation of Probation or Community Control—Failure to Pay Court-Ordered Costs or Restitution

 Hon. William H. Burgess, III, B.C.S.

Generally

Trial courts have the power to provide, as a condition of probation or community control, that the defendant pay reasonable sums for court costs¹ and other costs to the state (e.g., attorney’s fees for the services of a public defender),² costs of supervision,³ and restitution⁴ under the broad grant of authority contained in section 948.03, Fla. Stat.  The decision to place a defendant on supervision reflects a determination by the sentencing court that the State’s penological interests do not require imprisonment.⁵  In any event, a probationer’s or community controllee’s failure to make reasonable efforts to repay his or her debt to society may indicate that the original determination needs reevaluation, and imprisonment may now be required to satisfy the State’s interests,⁶ and so supervision can be revoked for failure to comply with such a condition.

This power is qualified by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which requires that the statutory ceiling placed on imprisonment for any substantive offense be the same for all defendants irrespective of their economic status.  The State therefor cannot imprison a defendant for nonvoluntary failure to pay a fine, court costs, or restitution without violating the equal protection clause.⁷  Likewise, the Constitution prohibits the State from imposing a fine as a sentence and then automatically converting it into a jail term solely because the defendant is indigent and cannot forthwith pay the fine in full.⁸  Sentencing a defendant to imprisonment solely because he or she could not pay a fine, court costs, or restitution, without considering the reasons for the inability to pay or the propriety of reducing the amount to be paid, extending the time for payments, or making alternative orders, is automatically converting monetary such obligations into imprisonment and is constitutionally impermissible.⁹  The requirement that a defendant may be found in willful violation of a supervisory condition to make money payments only if he or she is or could reasonably be financially in a position to do so is one of constitutional dimensions and cannot be waived by the defendant.¹⁰

Judicial Discretion In the Imposition of Sentence—Conditions of Confinement

Hon. William H. Burgess, III, B.C.S.

A sentencing court lacks jurisdiction and authority to regulate the treatment and placement of sentenced prison inmates absent specific statutory authority, and cannot impose increased sanctions pertaining to confinement, such as loss of privileges.  This rule applies to county jails as well as to facilities run by the Department of Corrections.¹

Once a trial court has pronounced sentence and entered a judgment of conviction, it relinquishes jurisdiction over the matter to the executive branch, except for the appellate process and to the extent that regular procedures allow the matter to be reopened in a judicial forum for limited purposes that can be achieved only in court.  Just as the executive branch of government may not intrude on the judiciary’s duties in the sentencing process, so is the judicial branch limited in its role thereafter as the sentence is executed.²

Confrontation, Due process, and the Use of Hearsay: The Florida Evidence Code Was Not Meant to Apply to Sentencing

Hon. William H. Burgess, III, B.C.S.

Accuracy and integrity of fact-finding in criminal sentencing is determined by the burden of proof, the reliability of the underlying evidence, and the opportunity for review and response. The balance of these factors promotes fairness in the individual case and in the overall pattern of sentences over time. Such accuracy is not an absolute in every type of case, however, but is measured against the requirements of the law applicable in the circumstances. Generally, the more severe the potential sanction, the higher the degree of accuracy and reliability of the evidence required to impose the sanction.

Sharp Practices in the Legal Profession

Hon. William H. Burgess, III, B.C.S. 

"Pettifogger" 3-D sculpture by Daniel Midholt, based on a design by Stefan Andersson.  Image found at https://www.artstation.com/artwork/zND4d. No claim to copyright.

One of the more vexing aspects of the legal profession is having to deal with attorneys who engage in sharp practice.

“Sharp practice” is a pejorative expression for unscrupulous conduct, undertaken for the purpose of obtaining an unfair advantage over another, that may (or may not) be technically within the applicable law or rules and is considered immoral, unethical or improper. In business dealings, sharp practice often involves activities that come very close to breaking the law.¹ In the legal profession, the greater part of sharp practice occurs on a continuum just beyond the proper bounds of zealous advocacy,² honor,³ and ethics but just short of outright fraud. It is the sort of behavior that no self-respecting lawyer or judge should have to suffer and no properly functioning legal system should tolerate.

Sentence Mitigation: Acceptance of Responsibility

Hon. William H. Burgess, III, B.C.S.

A common and longstanding practice in the trial courts of Florida is to reward defendants who accept responsibility for their actions with lighter sentences than those defendants might otherwise have received. Many prosecutors encourage this form of sentence mitigation and it is not unusual for prosecutors to agree to downward departure sentences for such defendants in appropriate circumstances, usually early in the case. Appellate courts have noted that acceptance of responsibility is an appropriate factor for the court to consider in mitigating a sentence.¹ As a practical matter, early acceptance of responsibility can show actual or potential rehabilitation,² and it furthers the important state interests in judicial efficiency and economy. There is, however, no consensus within the trial and appellate courts as to what “acceptance of responsibility” or “early acceptance of responsibility” is, and so it is an open question as to whether or not this is a valid stand-alone basis for departure below a presumptive minimum sentence.

Sentence Mitigation: Extraordinary Restitution

Hon. William H. Burgess, III, B.C.S.

Ordinarily, the payment or promised payment of restitution is not a basis for downward departure outside of the provisions of sections 921.0026(2)(e) and 921.185, Florida Statutes. A further basis for downward departure may be extraordinary restitution, whether paid before or after a defendant enters a plea, where the defendant demonstrates acceptance of responsibility and makes exceptional efforts to fully remedy the harm caused by the offense. The sentencing laws of Florida do not prohibit downward sentencing departures in such situations and no Florida appellate court has taken up the issue. Nonetheless, such a departure is arguably permitted in appropriate circumstances by the provisions of subsections 921.002(1)(c)¹ and (3).²

Sentence Mitigation: Any Degree of Restitution

Hon. William H. Burgess, III, B.C.S.

Alongside section 921.0026(2)(e), Fla. Stat., is another, older and more general, restitution departure statute. Section 921.185, which has been the law since 1974,¹ provides that

In the imposition of a sentence for any felony or misdemeanor involving property, but not injury or opportunity for injury to persons, the court, in its discretion, shall consider any degree of restitution a mitigation of the severity of an otherwise appropriate sentence.²

While section 921.0026(2)(e) focuses on the need for restitution in all cases sentenced under the Criminal Punishment Code, section 921.185 is focused on the actual payment of restitution in essentially all felony or misdemeanor property crimes where there is no injury or opportunity to injure anyone. Each statute thus serves a different purpose and may be applied simultaneously where circumstances justify the application of both,

Concurrent and Consecutive Sentencing Alternatives in Florida

Hon. William H. Burgess, III, B.C.S.

The basic alternatives for concurrent and consecutive sentencing alternatives under Florida law are as follows:

Discretionary Consecutive Sentencing

Same Indictment, Information, or Affidavit: A defendant convicted of two or more offenses charged in the same indictment, information, or affidavit or in consolidated indictments, informations, or affidavits must serve the sentences of imprisonment concurrently unless the court directs that two or more of the sentences be served consecutively.¹ The court must affirmatively express its intention that such sentences are to run concurrently; otherwise, they will run consecutively.²

Sentencing Alernatives for Violations of Probation or Community Control by Youthful Offenders

Hon. William H. Burgess, III, B.C.S.

In all cases, a violation of probation of community control must be willful and substantial to produce a revocation. “Willful and substantial” refers to the quality of the violation, whereas the terms “substantive” or “technical” refer to the type of violation—a nuance only present in the Youthful Offender sentencing scheme. Accordingly, a “technical” violation is a violation of a rule of probation or community control which is a byproduct of the original offense, while the term “substantive violation” in section 958.14 requires more than a mere breach of a condition of probation or community control. A substantive offense is one which is complete of itself and not dependent on another, and so a separate act that constitutes a violation of probation or community control becomes a substantive one when it involves the commission of a separate criminal offense.¹ A substantive violation does not require that the defendant be charged with a new criminal offense, or convicted of a new criminal offense prior to a finding of violation, or at all, and such a finding can be made when the new offense has been nolle prossed or dismissed.²

Upward Departure Under the Criminal Punishment Code for Third Degree Felonies That Are Not Forcible Felonies

Hon. William H. Burgess, III

The general presumption under Florida’s Criminal Punishment Code (CPC) is that only those offenders scoring 44 or less points on the sentencing scoresheet may receive a non-state prison sanction, absent the sentencing court imposing a downward departure.  A further presumption is that, under the CPC, the sentencing judge can impose as a lawful sentence any amount of incarceration up to the statutory maximum for any offense before the court for sentencing under the CPC.  The CPC has, in almost every aspect, eliminated the “upward departure” of the former determinate guidelines sentencing schemes and replaced it with an indeterminate sentencing scheme in which the judge is free to sentence up to the statutory maximum without having to provide written reasons for doing so.

A statutory exception to indeterminate sentencing under the CPC is found in section 775.082(10), Fla. Stat.  Under that section, if a defendant is sentenced for an offense committed on or after July 1, 2009, which is a third-degree felony but not a forcible felony as defined in section 776.08, and excluding any third-degree felony violation under chapter 810, and if the total sentence points pursuant to section 921.0024 are 22 points or fewer, the court must sentence the defendant to a nonstate prison sanction.  However, if the court makes written findings that a nonstate prison sanction could present a danger to the public, the court may sentence the offender to a state correctional facility pursuant to section 775.082.¹

 The “danger” may, at least in some cases, encompass pecuniary or economic harm.²

Further Mitigation of a Youthful Offender Sentence Through Completion of a Basic Training “Boot Camp” Program

Hon. William H. Burgess, III, B.C.S.

A way of further mitigation of a Youthful Offender (YO) sentence is through successful completion of a basic training, or “boot camp,” program run by the Department of Corrections (DOC), or a county of the state, authorized under section 958.04(4).¹

DOC is required to develop and implement a basic training program for youthful offenders sentenced or classified by the department as youthful offenders pursuant to chapter 958.  The period of time to be served at the basic training program must be no less than 120 days.²  The program is required to include marching drills, calisthenics, a rigid dress code, manual labor assignments, physical training with obstacle courses, training in decisionmaking and personal development, high school equivalency diploma and adult basic education courses, and drug counseling and other rehabilitation programs.³

Downward Departure Sentencing Where the Defendant Cooperated With the State to Resolve the Current Offense or Any Other Offense

Hon. William H. Burgess, III, B.C.S.

The sentencing court can mitigate a presumptive prison sentence for which there is no applicable minimum mandatory non-minimum mandatory where the defendant cooperated with the State to resolve the current offense or any other offense.¹ In applying this basis to depart, the court must make a finding based on competent substantial evidence that a crime, or crimes, had been resolved as a result of the defendant’s cooperation.² A resolution implies that a decision or determination has been made, such as the filing of charges or the closing of a case.³ “Cooperation with the State” was originally intended for those situations when there are multiple codefendants and one makes a deal with the State Attorney to assist in the prosecution of the other codefendants, and was not for application to persons who simply cooperated with law enforcement.⁴ Cooperation with the State has since come to mean cooperation with law enforcement, and not just cooperation with the prosecutor.⁵

Downward Departure Sentencing Where the Need for Payment of Restitution to the Victim Outweighs the Need for a Prison Sentence

Hon. William H. Burgess, III, C.B.E.

Consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, when deciding what sentence to initially impose, a sentencing judge may consider the entire background of a defendant, including employment history, financial resources, and ability to make restitution. The Constitution does not preclude a judge from actively using the sentencing process to encourage payment of restitution to victims of crimes, nor does it prevent a judge from showing mercy by reducing the severity of a previously imposed legal sentence.¹

In weighing the need for restitution versus the need for imprisonment, a court must take into consideration all of the relevant factors, including the victim’s need for restitution and the defendant's ability to pay. Evidence in support of restitution includes findings such as the nature of the victim’s loss, the effectiveness of restitution, and the consequences of imprisonment.² The amount of restitution due must be substantial and not be minor.³ The victim must have a “pressing need” to recover the restitution amount specified.⁴

Transfer From a County for Plea, Sentence, or Participation in a Problem-Solving Court

Hon. William H. Burgess, III, B.C.S.

A defendant arrested or held in a county other than that in which an indictment or information is pending against him or her may state in writing that he or she wishes to plead guilty or nolo contendere, to waive trial in the county in which the indictment or information is pending, and to consent to disposition of the case in the county in which the defendant was arrested or is held, subject to the approval of the prosecuting attorney of the court in which the indictment or information is pending.  Upon receipt of the defendant’s statement and the written approval of the prosecuting attorney, the clerk of the court in which the indictment or information is pending must transmit the papers in the proceeding, or certified copies thereof, to the clerk of the court of competent jurisdiction for the county in which the defendant is held, and the prosecution must continue in that county upon the information or indictment originally filed.  In the event a fine is imposed upon the defendant in that county, two-thirds thereof must be returned to the county in which the indictment or information was originally filed.¹

A Criminal Defendant's Right of Allocution at Sentencing

Hon. William H. Burgess, III, B.C.S.

In Florida, a criminal defendant prior to sentencing has the opportunity to make an unsworn statement without restraint to the sentencing judge in allocution.  The opportunity of the defendant to allocute gives the defendant a chance to express to the sentencing judge any additional information that will aid the court in making a sound and reasoned judgment as to the appropriate sentence to be imposed on the convicted defendant.¹  Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.720(b) specifically provides that the sentencing court “shall entertain submissions and evidence by the parties that are relevant to the sentence.”²  The language of the rule is mandatory,³ and under this rule, the defendant is entitled to make a statement and present argument to the court.⁴  The sentencing court cannot deny a defendant an opportunity to make such a statement before sentencing.⁵ The court cannot impose sentence without letting the defendant read his or her entire prepared statement at the sentencing hearing.⁶  Note that, while allocation is unsworn and cannot be compelled to be under oath outside the terms of a plea agreement, the court can require the defendant to be under oath if he or she offering testimony to a jury or to the judge on a sentencing departure issue.⁷

FOOTNOTES

¹Jean-Baptiste v. State, 155 So. 3d 1237 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015).

²Fla. R. Crim. P. Rule 3.720(b).

³Culbertson v. State, 306 So. 2d 142, 143 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975) (citing Mask v. State, 289 So. 2d 385, 387 (Fla.1973)).

⁴Davenport v. State, 787 So. 2d 32, 32 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).

⁵Ventura v. State, 741 So.2d 1187 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999).

⁶Hodierne v. State, 141 So. 3d 1254 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014).

⁷Jean-Baptiste v. State, 155 So. 3d 1237 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015).

New Year's Resolutions for Judges

Hon. William H. Burgess, III, B.C.S.

In response to my recent post, "New Year's Resolutions for Young Lawyers," I have been asked to turn the focus around to the bench and suggest a set of resolutions for jurists.  Here are my suggestions:

#1.  Always bear in mind that you are a servant of the law and not a ruler over the people who appear before you.

#2.  Come to the bench on time and prepared to make rulings on all matters before you.

#3.  Do not let your ego become engaged in any matter.

#4.  Always be polite and listen carefully to those who appear before you.

#5.  Do not make gratuitous comments or statements.

#6.  Base all of your rulings on the law, and not on emotion.

#7.  Be patient and understanding with young attorneys, and encourage them to grow.

#8.  Be patient and understanding with older attorneys, and encourage them to be respectful toward the court and their fellow attorneys.

#9.  Teach the attorneys who come before you that they are counselors first, and litigators second.

#10.  Issue written orders without undue delay, and ensure that the parties receive copies.

New Year's Resolutions for Young Lawyers

Hon. William H. Burgess, III, B.C.S.

Some people believe in New Year's Resolutions; some do not.  I think that it can be a very good thing for one to regroup at year's end and make a fresh start, especially in the case of a young professional.  With this in mind, the following are my suggested New Year's resolutions for young lawyers:

#1. Commit yourself to your own professional and career development.

#2. Master the rules of evidence and procedure.

#3. Improve your writing skills.

#4. Strengthen your relationships with your clients and your fellow lawyers.

#5. Master a new legal skill and become the go-to person for that skill.

#6. Sharpen your time management skills.

#7. If in a small firm or partnership, make marketing a top priority.

#8. Get involved with your local community, as pro bono or volunteer.

#9. Make it a priority to take care of your health and well being.

#10. Always come to court on time, fully prepared, and be on your best behavior.

Comment: Miller, Graham, and Resentencing of Juveniles Sentenced Under Mandatory Sentencing Schemes

Hon. William H. Burgess, III, B.C.S.

Miller v. Alabama¹ provides little guidance on how to proceed with resentencing juveniles convicted under mandatory sentencing schemes. Under Miller, while a sentence of life without parole remains constitutional in homicide cases, the sentencing court must be free to impose a lesser sentence when the defendant’s youth or the circumstances of the crime so indicate. Florida Statutes, however, do not currently provide for lesser sentences in first-degree murder cases. Miller has thus opened a breach in Florida’s sentencing statutes. The rule adopted by the First and Third Districts has been for the court to exercise restraint and for the parties to make their case before the trial court, where testimony may be taken, evidence presented, and argument made on all material issues to include the potential range of sentencing options.²

Sentencing for Unlawful Filing of False Documents or Records Against Real or Personal Property

by Hon. William H. Burgess, III, B.C.S.

At the end of April, 2013, the Florida Legislature passed, and has sent on to the Governor for signature, Senate Bill 112, a tough new law aimed at fully criminalizing the filing of false documents or records against real or personal property, and revising penalties for criminal actions under color of law or through use of simulated legal process. The Governor is expected to sign the bill into law in due course.  If signed by the Governor, the law will take effect on October 1, 2013.

There is a perception among more than a few prosecutors and civil attorneys that fraud is widespread in the civil courts, especially in the area of property litigation and that there is little to be done about it. SB 112 is a response to such concerns and is directed at a variety of fraudulent practices being perpetrated in civil court. The bill is directed, in particular, at the practice of filing false financial statements and bogus liens against the property of public officials and employees.¹ While the bill is aimed primarily at non-lawyers and pro se litigants, the provisions of the proposed law are applicable to unscrupulous lawyers as well.