Sentence Mitigation: Acceptance of Responsibility

Hon. William H. Burgess, III, B.C.S.

A common and longstanding practice in the trial courts of Florida is to reward defendants who accept responsibility for their actions with lighter sentences than those defendants might otherwise have received. Many prosecutors encourage this form of sentence mitigation and it is not unusual for prosecutors to agree to downward departure sentences for such defendants in appropriate circumstances, usually early in the case. Appellate courts have noted that acceptance of responsibility is an appropriate factor for the court to consider in mitigating a sentence.¹ As a practical matter, early acceptance of responsibility can show actual or potential rehabilitation,² and it furthers the important state interests in judicial efficiency and economy. There is, however, no consensus within the trial and appellate courts as to what “acceptance of responsibility” or “early acceptance of responsibility” is, and so it is an open question as to whether or not this is a valid stand-alone basis for departure below a presumptive minimum sentence.

Sentence Mitigation: Extraordinary Restitution

Hon. William H. Burgess, III, B.C.S.

Ordinarily, the payment or promised payment of restitution is not a basis for downward departure outside of the provisions of sections 921.0026(2)(e) and 921.185, Florida Statutes. A further basis for downward departure may be extraordinary restitution, whether paid before or after a defendant enters a plea, where the defendant demonstrates acceptance of responsibility and makes exceptional efforts to fully remedy the harm caused by the offense. The sentencing laws of Florida do not prohibit downward sentencing departures in such situations and no Florida appellate court has taken up the issue. Nonetheless, such a departure is arguably permitted in appropriate circumstances by the provisions of subsections 921.002(1)(c)¹ and (3).²

Sentence Mitigation: Any Degree of Restitution

Hon. William H. Burgess, III, B.C.S.

Alongside section 921.0026(2)(e), Fla. Stat., is another, older and more general, restitution departure statute. Section 921.185, which has been the law since 1974,¹ provides that

In the imposition of a sentence for any felony or misdemeanor involving property, but not injury or opportunity for injury to persons, the court, in its discretion, shall consider any degree of restitution a mitigation of the severity of an otherwise appropriate sentence.²

While section 921.0026(2)(e) focuses on the need for restitution in all cases sentenced under the Criminal Punishment Code, section 921.185 is focused on the actual payment of restitution in essentially all felony or misdemeanor property crimes where there is no injury or opportunity to injure anyone. Each statute thus serves a different purpose and may be applied simultaneously where circumstances justify the application of both,

Further Mitigation of a Youthful Offender Sentence Through Completion of a Basic Training “Boot Camp” Program

Hon. William H. Burgess, III, B.C.S.

A way of further mitigation of a Youthful Offender (YO) sentence is through successful completion of a basic training, or “boot camp,” program run by the Department of Corrections (DOC), or a county of the state, authorized under section 958.04(4).¹

DOC is required to develop and implement a basic training program for youthful offenders sentenced or classified by the department as youthful offenders pursuant to chapter 958.  The period of time to be served at the basic training program must be no less than 120 days.²  The program is required to include marching drills, calisthenics, a rigid dress code, manual labor assignments, physical training with obstacle courses, training in decisionmaking and personal development, high school equivalency diploma and adult basic education courses, and drug counseling and other rehabilitation programs.³

Downward Departure Sentencing Where the Defendant Cooperated With the State to Resolve the Current Offense or Any Other Offense

Hon. William H. Burgess, III, B.C.S.

The sentencing court can mitigate a presumptive prison sentence for which there is no applicable minimum mandatory non-minimum mandatory where the defendant cooperated with the State to resolve the current offense or any other offense.¹ In applying this basis to depart, the court must make a finding based on competent substantial evidence that a crime, or crimes, had been resolved as a result of the defendant’s cooperation.² A resolution implies that a decision or determination has been made, such as the filing of charges or the closing of a case.³ “Cooperation with the State” was originally intended for those situations when there are multiple codefendants and one makes a deal with the State Attorney to assist in the prosecution of the other codefendants, and was not for application to persons who simply cooperated with law enforcement.⁴ Cooperation with the State has since come to mean cooperation with law enforcement, and not just cooperation with the prosecutor.⁵

Downward Departure Sentencing Where the Need for Payment of Restitution to the Victim Outweighs the Need for a Prison Sentence

Hon. William H. Burgess, III, C.B.E.

Consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, when deciding what sentence to initially impose, a sentencing judge may consider the entire background of a defendant, including employment history, financial resources, and ability to make restitution. The Constitution does not preclude a judge from actively using the sentencing process to encourage payment of restitution to victims of crimes, nor does it prevent a judge from showing mercy by reducing the severity of a previously imposed legal sentence.¹

In weighing the need for restitution versus the need for imprisonment, a court must take into consideration all of the relevant factors, including the victim’s need for restitution and the defendant's ability to pay. Evidence in support of restitution includes findings such as the nature of the victim’s loss, the effectiveness of restitution, and the consequences of imprisonment.² The amount of restitution due must be substantial and not be minor.³ The victim must have a “pressing need” to recover the restitution amount specified.⁴

Comment: Florida's Prison Diversion Statute, Section 921.00241

Hon. William H. Burgess, III, B.C.S.

Notwithstanding section 921.0024, Fla. Stat., and effective for offenses committed after July 1, 2009, a court may divert from the state correctional system a defendant who would otherwise be sentenced to a state facility by sentencing the defendant to a nonstate prison sanction as provided in section 921.00241(2).¹ A defendant may be sentenced to a nonstate prison sanction if the offender meets all of the following criteria:

Alternative Sentencing: Youthful Offender Downward Departures

A “youthful offender” (YO) is any person who is sentenced as such by the court or is classified as such by the Department of Corrections pursuant to section 958.04.[FN1] There are two ways by which a defendant can become entitled to the benefits of the YO statute. Either the trial court can sentence the defendant as a YO, or the Department of Corrections can designate a defendant who was sentenced as an adult to be a YO.[FN2]

Qualification

Pursuant to section 958.04, F.S., the court may sentence as a YO any person:

(a) Who is at least 18 years of age or who has been transferred for prosecution to the criminal division of the circuit court pursuant to chapter 985;

(b) Who is found guilty of or who has tendered, and the court has accepted, a plea of nolo contendere or guilty to a crime that is, under the laws of this state, a felony if the offender is younger than 21 years of age at the time sentence is imposed; and

(c) Who has not previously been classified as a youthful offender under the provisions of chapter 985; however, a person who has been found guilty of a capital or life felony may not be sentenced as a YO under the Youthful Offender Act.

Pre-Plea Downward Departure Sentencing Hearings

One of the most practiced ways to mitigate a defendant’s sentence, where no other alternatives are available, is through a downward departure from the Criminal Punishment Code sentencing "floor." It is, in fact the practice of some defense counsel to seek a "departure hearing" before a defendant enters a plea to test the court for leniency, although some courts will not entertain such a hearing until the defendant has pled.


Pre-plea "departure hearings" comprise an unauthorized blending of plea discussion and agreement with the conduct of a sentencing hearing, and the creation of a legal fiction that an offense is not "before the court for sentencing," so as to evade requirements of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure and statutory law. Such hearings are a means for the defendant to get a commitment from the presiding judge as to whether and how much of a downward departure sentence he or she will impose if and when the defendant decides to plea without making any commitment in return. Typically, these hearings are used by the defendant to put on evidence in mitigation without the defendant accepting any responsibility for having committed any wrongful act, which is a contradiction the Rules of Criminal Procedure are designed to prevent. This technique also places a legally unrecognizable burden on the prosecutor and any victim or victims involved to overcome such mitigation and persuade the judge not to depart downward in the event that the defendant does decide to enter a plea. Under the former guidelines, where upward departure was a possibility, the prosecutor would often try to blunt the defense request for downward departure by putting on evidence in aggravation and requesting an upward departure during the same hearing. Additionally, the conduct of a pre-plea departure hearing tends to invert and short-circuit the trial process by substituting the defendant’s case for leniency for the prosecutor’s presentation of all relevant evidence of guilt before a jury in a trial. Such a procedure is also contrary to principles of judicial economy and entails the potential for otherwise unnecessary and avoidable recusal consequences.